

CONFIDENTIALDocument No. **5**

NO CHANGE in Class.

 DECLASSIFIED

Class. CHANGED TO TS S C

DDA Memo, 4 Apr 73

Auth: DDA REG. 77-1763

Date: 060473 BY 025

CONFIDENTIAL

This document is hereby regarded as
CONFIDENTIAL in accordance with the
letter of 16 October 1978 from the
Director of Central Intelligence to the
Archivist of the United States.

Next Review Date: 2008

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

25X1A

COUNTRY Germany/Russian Zone

DATE:

SUBJECT SED Propaganda Instructions

INFO. 22-23 January 1947

ORIGIN

DIST. 25 March 1947
PAGES 2
SUPPLEMENT

25X1A

FD
347

1. At a secret meeting of SED functionaries 22-23 January 1947, which was also attended by a few KPD leaders from the west, members of the Central Executive Committee gave instructions as to the propaganda line to be followed until the time of the Moscow Conference. The main points covered were:
 - a. The future eastern boundary of Germany,
 - b. The change in U. S. foreign policy,
 - c. The question of the SPD in the Russian Zone and the rest of Germany.
2. Propaganda for revision of the eastern frontier is to be suppressed, especially in refugee camps and centers. The Russians have made binding promises to stop dismantling and to decrease reparations demands. The promised increased industrial production guarantees the influence of the Russian Zone over the rest of Germany. This Russian promise is forcing the hesitant western powers to accept economic unity of Germany. With this in view, the SED can increase its propaganda for retention of the Ruhr and even the Saar as essential, while writing off Silesia, East Prussia, and Pomerania. The SED argument is that Russia's influence over Poland is so strong that a socialistic Germany is bound to profit by it. The eastern economic sphere reaches from the Urals to the Elbe already; at the speed of industrial recovery under Russian measures, it will soon extend its influence at least to the Rhine.
3. The functionaries were urged to combat the "wide-spread opinion" that the appointment of General Marshall as Secretary of State means a weakening of Russia's position in Four-Power affairs. All news of U. S. military and economic strength is to be played down. The SED is blamed by the Russians for alleged German fear of U. S. industrial might. Marshall's mission to China is to be characterized as a failure. Rumors that Russia's industrial difficulties make it dependent on American support are to be attacked with all available means.

CONFIDENTIAL

25X9

CLASSIFICATION NOTICE THIS DISTRIBUTION LISTING MUST BE

ADSO	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> A DEP.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> FBI	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SPB	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> VTO	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DPA	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DOCUMENT.	
DADSO	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> FBK	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> FBV	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SPDS				
EXEC.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> FBL	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> FBX	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SPDI		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CFCB		
CONTROL	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> FBM	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> FRZ	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SCO		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CTB		
PLANS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> FBP	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SPDA	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> TBS				

4. The meeting was informed that the Russians are considering readmitting the SPD in their zone. If this step is taken it will not mean a weakening of the SED but simply an SED penetration of the SPD. Such a new SPD in the Russian Zone would be built up under reliable SED leaders. The Russians would gain two advantages by readmitting the SPD:

- a. A strengthening of their position vis-a-vis the other powers, since it would rob the latter of one of the strongest arguments against the SMA.
- b. The establishment of relations with the entire SPD and, through it, with the Labor Party in England.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL